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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue No. I. Did the district court err in concluding as a matter of law based upon 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and based on the well-pleaded facts of the 
amended complaint that each of Plaintiff7Appellant Russell/Packard Development, Inc.'s 
("Russell/Packard") and PlaintiftfAppellant Lawrence M. Russell's ("Russell") 
(collectively referred to as the "Russell Plaintiffs") claims are barred by the applicable 
statutes of limitation? (R. at 64-68.) 
Standard of Review. A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed 
for correctness. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,1256 (Utah 1998). Under the 
correctness standard, no deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law. 
Id. 
Issue No. 2. Did the district court err in concluding as a matter of law based upon 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and based on the well-pleaded facts of the 
amended complaint that the Russell Plaintiffs lack standing to assert each of their claims? 
(R. at 68-69, 39-42.) 
Standard of Review. A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed 
for correctness. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,1256 (Utah 1998). Under the 
1 
correctness standard, no deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law. 
Id. 
Issue No. 3. Did the district court err in concluding as a matter of law based upon 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and based on the well-pleaded facts of the 
amended complaint that the Russell Plaintiffs failed to plead with particularity facts 
sufficient to support a claim for fraud? (R. at 1-18,69-70,72-91.) 
Standard of Review. A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed 
for correctness. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,1256 (Utah 1998). Under the 
correctness standard, no deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law. 
Id 
Issue No. 4. Did the district court err in concluding as a matter of law based upon 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and based on the well-pleaded facts of the 
amended complaint that Defendants/Appellees owed no fiduciary duties to the Russell 
Plaintiffs? (R. at 70.) 
Standard of Review. A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed 
for correctness. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,1256 (Utah 1998). Under the 




The following statutory provisions are of central importance to the outcome of this 
appeal and are attached in their entirety in the Addendum: Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-
25(3), 78-12-26(4), 78-27-26; Rule 9(b), Utah R. Civ. P. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
On November 30,2001, the Russell Plaintiffs filed a Complaint and Jury Demand 
against Defendants/Appellees Joel Carson ("Carson"), William Bustos ("Bustos") and 
John Thomas ("Thomas") (collectively referred to as the "Carson Defendants") asserting 
eight separate claims: 1) fraud; 2) breach of fiduciary duty; 3) civil conspiracy to defraud 
and to breach duties; 4) commercial bribery; 5) unjust enrichment; 6) conversion and 
misappropriation of proprietary property; 7) breach of principal-agency relationship; and 
8) intentional interference with prospective economic relations. (R. at 1-18.) The Carson 
Defendants each filed motions to dismiss. (R. at 29-57.) In response, the Russell 
Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand delineating more fully when 
the applicable statutes of limitations were tolled and when they began to run as well as 
amplifying the facts relating to standing. (R. at 72-91.) They also filed a joint opposition 
to the motions. (R. at 58-71.) 
The district court conducted a hearing on and granted the motions. (R. at 149, 
207.) Counsel for Carson prepared a proposed Order of Dismissal, to which the Russell 
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Plaintiffs objected. (R. at 150-152,193-194.) On June 10,2002 the district court entered 
a Minute Entry denying the objection and signed an order dismissing the Russell 
Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. (R. at 191-194.) The Russell Plaintiffs filed this appeal. 
(R. at 195-197.) 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Governing Factual Standard. 
This district court's dismissal was made pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The 
Utah Supreme Court has ruled that in deciding motions to dismiss, trial courts "must 
'accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Prows 
v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991) (citing #. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)). "[I]f there is any doubt about whether a claim 
should be dismissed for lack of factual basis, the issue should be resolved in favor of 
giving the party an opportunity to present its proof." Colman v. Utah State LandBd., 795 
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (citingBaur v. Pac. Fin. Corp., 383 P.2d 397, 397 (1963)). 
Under this standard, the facts set forth below are based upon those pled in the complaints 
and must be accepted as true for purposes of this appeal. 
2. Facts Relating to the Transaction. 
Russell/Packard is a real estate development corporation engaged in the 
development and construction of residential homes. (R. at 75 ffif 15-17.) Russell is its 
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principal shareholder and Chief Executive Officer. (R. at 75 f 15.) Russell/Packard and 
Russell formed a Utah limited liability company named PRP Development L.C. ("PRP") 
with Thomas through Thomas'affiliation with Premier Homes, L.C. (R. at 75 ^ 18.) The 
purpose of PRP was to develop and construct residential homes for retail sale in the State 
of Utah. (Id.) Thomas was the manager of PRP. As such he became an agent and 
fiduciary of the Russell Plaintiffs. (R. at 75 f 19,76 f 26.) 
Saratoga Springs Development, L.L.C. ("Saratoga") owned 72 undeveloped twin 
home lots in the city of Saratoga Springs, Utah County ("Saratoga Lots"). Saratoga had 
retained the brokerage services of Wardley Better Homes and Gardens Real Estate 
("Wardley") to market and sell the Saratoga Lots. Dan Cary ("Cary"), an agent with 
Wardley, was the listing agent for the Saratoga Lots. (R. at 75-76 ffif 20-21.) 
Carson and Bustos were also real estate agents with Wardley. (R. at 73 ffl[ 3-4.) In 
addition to being fellow Wardley employees, Carson had an independent business 
relationship with Bustos and had previous dealings with Thomas in the real estate sales, 
development and construction industry in Utah. At the time the Saratoga Lots were for 
sale, Thomas owed Bustos significant sums of money from one of their previous business 
dealings. (R. at 76 ffij 22-26.) 
In the summer of 1996, Thomas, Bustos and Carson became aware of the 
availability of the Saratoga Lots. (R. at 77 ^ 27.) They conspired and acted to cause what 
is known as a "flip purchase and sale" of the Saratoga Lots. (R. at 77-80 ffi[ 28-51.) They 
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used a fictitious entity named CMT, Inc. ("CMT") to purchase the Saratoga Lots for 
$25,000 a piece and immediately resold them to PRP for $30,000 each, making a profit of 
$360,000, despite the fact they were fiduciaries of Saratoga and the Russell Plaintiffs. 
(Id) 
The Carson Defendants accomplished their scheme as follows. Thomas 
approached Cary about PRP purchasing the Saratoga Lots from Saratoga and retained 
Carson to act as PRP's agent for this purpose. Thomas and Carson negotiated with Cary 
for PRP to purchase the Saratoga Lots directly from Saratoga. (R. at 77 ffi[ 28-30.) 
During their negotiations, Carson and Thomas consistently referred to PRP as the builder 
or buyer and Saratoga as the seller or developer. (R. at 80 If 56, 207 at pgs. 26-27.) 
Carson and Thomas further lead Saratoga to believe PRP was purchasing the Saratoga 
Lots directly from Saratoga by presenting to Saratoga, through Thomas' connection with 
PRP, PRP's proprietary plans and drawings for the development and construction of the 
Saratoga Lots. (R. at 78 Tf 41.) 
In the fall of 1996, the Carson Defendants, formally offered to purchase the 
Saratoga Lots from Saratoga for $25,000 each. The offer, however, names CMT as buyer 
instead of PRP ("CMT Contract"). (R. at 77 ffi[ 32-33.) Carson told Cary on several prior 
occasions that CMT was affiliated with, a part of, or owned by PRP. (R. at 7 f^ 35, 78 f^ 
35.) At the time the statements were made, CMT had no relationship with PRP. In fact, 
CMT was not even an existing legal entity until its incorporation in California on 
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December 5,1996, over one month after executing the CMT Contract. CMT has never 
registered to do business in the State of Utah. CMT was a fictitious entity controlled by 
the Carson Defendants. (R. at 78 ffif 35-36.) 
Believing CMT was affiliated with or a part of PRP, based on the representations 
by the Carson Defendants, Saratoga agreed to sell the Saratoga Lots to CMT. On 
November 4,1996, Saratoga and CMT executed the CMT Contract, which identifies 
Carson as CMT's agent. (R. at 78-79 ffif 40-42.) That same day, the title company 
received a $10,000 earnest money wire from an entity known as Poe Investments ("Poe"). 
Poe's members at that time were Carson and Bustos. (R. at 79 ^  43.) 
Also on November 4,1996, and not coincidentally, Thomas executed a formal 
offer on behalf of PRP to purchase the Saratoga Lots from CMT for $30,000 each. (R. at 
79K44.) The Russell Plaintiffs were led by the Carson Defendants to believe that CMT 
was affiliated with, a part of, or owned by Saratoga and that PRP was purchasing the 
Saratoga Lots directly from Saratoga, which is the manner in which the negotiations had 
been conducted. (R. at 78 K 37.) 
CMT of course accepted the offer and the deal was memorialized on November 8, 
1996 ("PRP Contract"). (R. at 79 ^ 45.) Carson is listed in the PRP Contract as the agent 
for both PRP and CMT. (R. at 79 ffi[ 46-47.) The PRP Contract, like the CMT Contract, 
references earnest money from PRP of $5,000. Thomas issued a check from PRP to 
Superior Title for $5,000 dated only "November 1996" which references earnest money. 
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It, however, was never processed by the bank for payment. Instead, the $10,000 earnest 
money wire under the CMT Contract referencing Poe was distributed at closing by checks 
to Carson and to Bustos at their direction. (R. at 79-80 ^  48.) 
The CMT Contract and the PRP Contract had identical closing terms except for the 
price. (R. 80 ^ 49.) The Carson Defendants, through CMT, interjected themselves as 
undisclosed agents and principals for CMT and/or Poe while acting as agents and 
fiduciaries of the Russell Plaintiffs to cause the flip purchase and sale for their own 
benefit and at the expense of Saratoga and the Russell Plaintiffs. (R. at 80 fflf 50-51.) 
Had the Russell Plaintiffs known of the flip sale and purchase, they would not have 
consented to PRP's purchase of the Saratoga Lots from CMT. (R. at 80-81 ^ 54.) 
Because of the actions and statements of the Carson Defendants, neither 
Russell/Packard nor Russell discovered CMT was not the agent for, under the control of, 
or otherwise acting for Saratoga until the Spring of 2000 when an accountant working for 
Saratoga questioned the ownership or control status of CMT and discovered the 
possibility of the flip sale and purchase while preparing for the closings on the final 
twelve Saratoga Lots. (R. at 81 f 55.) It was the first time the Russell Plaintiffs 
discovered CMT was not the agent for, under the control of, or otherwise acting for 
Saratoga. (R. at 81 ^ 58.) At all times previous to that, the Carson Defendants furthered 
their scheme by consistently introducing Saratoga to the Russell Plaintiffs as the builder 
or buyer and introducing Saratoga and its representatives the Russell Plaintiffs as the 
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seller or developer. Those representations not only lead Saratoga and the Russell 
Plaintiffs to believe PRP was purchasing the lots directly from Saratoga but resulted in 
the concealment until the Spring of 2000 of the fact CMT was not affiliated with either 
PRP or Saratoga. (R. at 81 ffif 56 & 59.) 
The Saratoga accountant's question about the ownership and control status of 
CMT in connection with the closing of the last twelve of the lots led Saratoga to a search 
to find a link between CMT and PRP or the Russell Plaintiffs. When no link could be 
found, Saratoga contacted the Russell Plaintiffs to see of the Russell Plaintiffs could 
explain the situation. (R. at 81 ^ 55.) This was when the Russell Plaintiffs were first 
placed on notice that CMT was not affiliated with Saratoga, which led the Russell 
Plaintiffs to further investigate the true nature of the transactions. (Id.) That investigation 
concerning the ownership and control of CMT and the circumstances of the CMT 
Contract and PRP Contract took over one year and revealed the true nature of the flip sale 
and purchase. (R. at 81-82 fflf 55, 58- 60.) After learning these facts, the Russell 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint and Jury Demand on November 30,2001. (R. at 1-18.) 
They did not file before then because they did not have an adequate factual basis 
sufficient to establish any wrongful conduct. 
3. Facts Relating to Russell/Packard's and Russell's Standing. 
In April 1997, the Russell Plaintiffs sold their interest in PRP to Premier Homes 
Construction, L.C., a company in which Thomas was also a member. (R. at 39-42.) In 
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exchange, PRP paid Russell/Packard and Russell $5,000 and assigned Russell "all of its 
right, title and interest in the [PRP] Contract and its right to acquire the Saratoga Property 
at the time of closing." (R. at 39.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court granted the Carson Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motions "for the 
reasons specified, both here at oral argument and in the supporting memoranda." (R. at 
207 at pg. 47.) The Carson Defendants asserted the following identical arguments at oral 
argument and in their briefs: 1) the Russell Plaintiffs5 claims are barred by the various 
statutes of limitations; 2) the Russell Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue those claims; and 
3) the Russell Plaintiffs failed to plead their fraud claim with sufficient particularity. (R. 
at 29-57.) Bustos additionally argued the claims against him were barred because he had 
no agency relationship with the Russell Plaintiffs. (R. at 54.) 
The district court erred in dismissing the Russell Plaintiffs' claims for four 
reasons. First, the Carson Defendants concealed their wrongful conduct, tolling the 
applicable statutes of limitation until Russell/Packard and Russell first learned in the 
Spring of 2000 that CMT was not affiliated with Saratoga, which put them on notice to 
conduct further inquiry into the Carson Defendants5 actions. It was not until over one 
year later that the Russell Plaintiffs had sufficient facts to support their claims. Because 
they filed their complaint in November of 2001, they were well within the applicable 
limitations periods for each claim. Second, the facts as pled establish the Russell 
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Plaintiffs acquired from PRP all right, title and interest in the Saratoga Lots, the sale of 
which forms the basis for Plaintiffs' claims, making the Russell Plaintiffs the only ones 
with standing to pursue those claims. Third, the complaint contained sufficient facts to 
assert a claim for fraud and any issue about the facts involved factual determinations that 
should have been developed through discovery and decided by a trier of fact. Finally, no 
agency relationship between the Russell Plaintiffs and Bustos was necessary to establish 
the claims against him. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE RUSSELL 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 
APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
The Carson Defendants argued seven of the Russell Plaintiffs5 eight claims are 
barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.1 Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) sets the 
limitations period for the following claims the Russell Plaintiffs asserted below: breach 
of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy to defraud and to breach duties, unjust enrichment, 
breach of principal-agency relationship and intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations (collectively referred to as the "four-year claims"). It requires they be 
1
 Bustos failed in his opening and reply memoranda to argue or present any facts 
whatsoever demonstrating the discovery rule should not apply. (R. at 92-98.) Carson did 
not explain in his opening memorandum why the discovery rule did not apply to all 
claims but addressed the issue in his reply memorandum. (R. at 31-50,103-109.) 
Thomas simply joined in the arguments made in Bustos' and Carson's memoranda. (R. at 
124.) 
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brought within four years of the date the cause of action accrues. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
12-26(4) sets the limitations period for commercial bribery claims at three years. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-26 sets for the limitations period for claims involving fraud at three 
years as well. It additionally contains an internal discovery requirement, stating, "[T]he 
cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of 
the facts constituting the fraud " Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-26(3). Each of these 
periods were tolled by the "discovery rule," making the Russell Plaintiffs' claims timely 
and the district court's dismissal for failure to comply with the statutes of limitation 
erroneous. 
"Under the discovery rule, 'the limitations period does not begin to run until the 
discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action.'" Berenda v. Langford, 914 
P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996) (quoting O'Neal v. Div. of Family Servs., 821 P.2d 1139, 1143 
(Utah 1991) (internal quotation marks and additional citation omitted). The discovery 
rule applies in three circumstances: 
"(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in 
situations where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action 
because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in 
situations where die case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of 
any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of 
action." 
Spears v. Wan, 2002 UT 24 at \ 33,44 P.3d 742 (quoting Warren v. Provo City Corp., 
838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)). While the applicability of a statute of limitations and 
12 
discovery rule are questions of law, "the applicability of the statute of limitations and the 
discovery rule also involves a subsidiary factual determination-the point at which a 
person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury. This is a 
question of fact." Id. at \ 32 (citing Sevy v. Sec. Title Co. ofS. Utah, 902 P.2d 629,634 
(Utah 1995); Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1993)) (emphases added). 
The Russell Plaintiffs pled, and there is no dispute, that the PRP Contract was 
executed on November 8,1996. There is also no dispute the Russell Plaintiffs filed their 
Complaint and Jury Demand on November 30,2001. Therefore, absent tolling by the 
discovery rule, the statute of limitations expired on the commercial bribery and fraud 
claims on November 7, 1999 and on the remaining four-year claims on November 7, 
2000. 
The Russell Plaintiffs also affirmatively pled, however, facts supporting the 
application of the discovery rule, thereby tolling the applicable statutes of limitation until 
the Spring of 2000. They alleged as follows: 
At the time the CMT contract, signed on November 4,1996, and the 
PRP contract, signed on November 8,1996, were executed, Carson, Bustos, 
and Thomas set on a course of conduct through agreement to conceal from 
plaintiffs and Saratoga CMT's relationship to the defendants and CMT's 
lack of relationship to the plaintiffs and Saratoga. 
[]This concealment was a necessary part of the scheme and device to 
permit the CMT contract to be signed by Saratoga on November 4,1996, 
and to "flip the sale" to PRP on November 8,1996. 
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[]This intentional concealment and failure to disclose to plaintiffs the 
fact that CMT was not owned by or controlled through Saratoga or, as to 
Saratoga, CMT was not owned by or in the control of plaintiffs, plaintiffs 
and Saratoga would not have permitted the flip purchase and sale through 
CMT while Carson and Thomas were acting as agents and fiduciaries of 
plaintiffs or to benefit Bustos. 
[JPlaintiffs did not discover that CMT was not the agent for, under 
the control of, owned by, or otherwise acting for, Saratoga, in connection 
with the sale of the lots, until spring of 2000, when an accountant working 
for Saratoga discovered the possibility of a flip sale and purchase, which 
prompted discussions between Russell on the one hand, and a representative 
of Saratoga on the other hand. 
[]At all times previous to that, defendants formulated a scheme in 
which plaintiffs were introduced to Saratoga by the defendants and always 
referred to as the builder or buyer, and Saratoga's representatives were 
introduced to plaintiffs by the defendants and always referred to as the 
seller or developer. 
[]On information and belief, in the spring of 2000, an accountant for 
Saratoga questioned the ownership or control status of CMT, in connection 
with the "take down" or closing of the last twelve of the lots. 
[JSaratoga, on information and belief, was then placed on inquiry 
notice that CMT may not have been the agent or under the control of 
plaintiffs and, after discussions with Saratoga's representatives in the spring 
of 2000, plaintiffs were first placed on inquiry notice of CMT's control 
status as well. 
[]This affirmative conduct and concealment of the defendants 
constituted a pattern during October and November 1996 during the sale 
and continued thereafter through spring of 2000 that CMT was known only 
to plaintiffs as Saratoga's agent or company owned by or under the control 
of Saratoga. The active concealment continued until spring of 2000 by the 
defendants. 
[]After the conversation with Saratoga's representative concerning 
CMT's actual status, further inquiry and investigation were made by 
14 
plaintiffs concerning the ownership and control of CMT and the 
circumstances of the two contracts signed in November 1996 by plaintiffs 
and Saratoga. 
(R. at 80-82 ffif 52-62.) The Russell Plaintiffs additionally explained in depth their 
memorandum opposing the motions to dismiss how these facts operated to toll the 
applicable statutes of limitation. (R. at 53-55,64-68.) 
Two of the three circumstances necessary to apply the discovery rule are present in 
this case: 1) discovery of the wrong is mandated by statute for the fraud claim; and 2) the 
Carson Defendants actively concealed their wrongful conduct for all claims, including the 
claim for fraud. The Russell Defendants pled they first learned CMT was not affiliated 
with Saratoga in the Spring of 2000. Because the PRP Contract was signed on November 
8,1996, the three-year limitations period for the fraud claim expired on November 7, 
1999, which was before the Russell Plaintiffs were even put on notice to inquire further 
into the transaction. Under the discovery provision mandated by the statute of limitations 
governing fraud claims, the district court should have applied the discovery rule to the 
Russell Plaintiffs' fraud claim and denied the motions to dismiss. 
The concealment prong of the discovery rule also applies in this case, not only to 
the remaining claims, but to the fraud claim as well. The concealment prong provides 
that where a plaintiff does not become aware of a cause of action because of a defendant's 
concealment or misleading conduct, the statute of limitations is tolled '"until the 
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discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action."5 Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16 
at \ 15,28 P.3d 1271 (quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the fraudulent concealment prong of the 
discovery rule recently in Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16,28 P.3d 1271. The court in Hill 
explained the general test applied in determining whether a limitations statute should be 
tolled based on concealment. It stated: 
Fraudulent concealment under the discovery rule requires determining (i) 
when a plaintiff would reasonably be on notice to inquire into a defendant's 
bad acts despite defendant's attempts to hide those acts; and (ii) whether a 
plaintiff, once on notice, reasonably would have discovered, with due 
diligence, the facts on which the cause of action is based despite the 
defendant's efforts to hide those facts. 
Id at 1f 18 (citing Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 52 (Utah 1996)). 
The Carson Defendants argued, and the district court held, the discovery rule did 
not apply to any of the Russell Plaintiffs' claims because they admitted in their amended 
complaint they discovered in the Spring of 2000 that CMT was not affiliated with 
Saratoga. Therefore, the court concluded, the Russell Plaintiffs had knowledge of their 
potential claims before expiration of the limitations period, giving rise to a duty to file 
those claims before expiration of the limitations period. (R. at 103-105.) The district 
court's ruling was erroneous. 
The Russell Plaintiffs pled concealment by the Carson Defendants in detail. While 
the Russell Plaintiffs learned for the first time in the Spring of 2000 that CMT was not 
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associated with Saratoga, which was approximately five months prior to the expiration of 
the four-year limitations periods, and after the expiration of the three-year periods, they 
did not discover actual facts forming the basis for their causes of action until after the 
November 7,2001 deadline. The inability to find a link in the Spring of 2000 was not 
proof the Carson Defendants had wronged the Russell Defendants. It merely alerted the 
Russell Plaintiffs that something might be wrong and gave rise to a duty by them to 
further investigate the true nature of the transactions. It was not until they conducted 
further inquiry and investigation, and past all relevant statutes of limitation, that the 
Russell Plaintiffs learned the true nature of the scheme and that the statutes began to run. 
The Russell Plaintiffs filed their claims within the statutes once the discovery rule is 
applied. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar distinction between discovering one 
may have been wronged and learning facts forming the basis for a cause of action in Hill, 
2001 UT 16, 28 P.3d 1271. There, the plaintiffs agents gave the defendants $1.54 
million to purchase a ranch. The plaintiff did not learn of the transfer until February 1990 
when the agents informed her the defendants had absconded with her money. The 
plaintiff met with the defendants in March 1990. They told her they did not have her 
money. Id. at fflf 3-6. She, therefore, hired a private investigator to locate it, which he 
was unable to do. Id. at % 7. Four years later and still without her money, the plaintiff 
hired two new investigators. In December of 1994, two of the defendants admitted to the 
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investigators that another defendant had fled with her money. Id. at fflj 8-9. The plaintiff 
did not learn of these facts until July 1995. Id. 
The plaintiff filed her complaint in August 1997 asserting claims for, among other 
things, fraud, unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy. Id. at \ 11. The defendants filed a 
motion for summary judgment arguing the statute of limitations barred her claims because 
the facts supporting them occurred in late 1989. Id. at ^  13. The plaintiff opposed the 
motion on the ground the discovery rule tolled the limitations period. The trial court 
disagreed and granted the motion. The plaintiff appealed. Id. at f 1. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed summary judgment and remanded the case for 
trial. Id. It ruled the defendants' active concealment of facts giving rise to plaintiffs5 
claims tolled the statute of limitations until July 1995, when plaintiff first learned of the 
facts giving rise to her claims and discovered the identities of the defendants. Id. at ^ J19. 
It explained that operation of the discovery rule "prevents the limitations period from 
beginning to run until the facts forming the foundation for the cause of action are 
discovered." Id. at \ 15 (citing Williams v. Howard, 970 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Utah 1998)). 
Like the plaintiff in Hill, the Russell Plaintiffs may have been put on notice they 
may have been wronged prior to expiration of the statute of limitations, but did not learn 
"facts forming the foundation for the cause of action" until after expiration of the 
limitations period due to the necessity of conducting an investigation into what happened. 
Id. at f 15. As in Hill, the district court should have applied the discovery rule based on 
18 
concealment by the Carson Defendants, thereby tolling the limitations periods until the 
Spring of 2000, making the Russell Plaintiffs' claims timely. Its failure to do so 
constitutes reversible error. 
The Carson Defendants additionally argued no concealment actually occurred 
because Russell/Packard had reasonable notice PRP was not purchasing the Saratoga Lots 
directly from Saratoga at the time of the first closing, which occurred sometime in 1997, 
from the closing documents which showed CMT was the owner. (R. at 105-109). The 
Russell Plaintiffs, however, explained why these documents did not impart reasonable 
notice to them of CMT's actual part in the scheme. It is common for developers and 
builders to create special entities to with different names to "own" a project. Therefore, 
the fact CMT was named as the seller in the closing documents does not give notice to a 
reasonable person or even a reasonable developer or builder that CMT was not affiliated 
with Saratoga. (R. at 207 at pg. 28.) The fact that Saratoga also did not learn CMT was 
not associated with PRP until the Spring of 2000 further supports the Russell Plaintiffs' 
argument that the closing documents by themselves, as alleged by the Carson Defendants, 
did not impart reasonable notice of CMT's position. The Utah Supreme Court ruled in 
Hill that once there is an allegation: 
a defendant has concealed a plaintiffs cause of action, the questions of 
when a plaintiff should reasonably begin inquiring about the defendant's 
wrongdoing and whether, once on notice, the plaintiff has acted with 
reasonable diligence to discover the facts forming the basis of the cause of 
action are all highly fact-dependent legal questions We explicitly 
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acknowledge that weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in 
light of the defendant's steps to conceal the cause of action necessitates the 
type offactualfindings which preclude summary judgment in all but the 
clearest of cases. 
Id. (citing Berenda, 914 P.2d at 53-54; Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 
1181,1186 (Utah 1989) (stating that in medical malpractice action "close calls" of 
whether plaintiffs acted reasonably in failing to discover the cause of action "are for 
juries, not judges, to make'5)) (emphases added). 
With these facts pled, the district court could not have reached its decision without 
weighing whether the Russell Plaintiffs' conduct was reasonable against the Carson 
Defendants' efforts to conceal their wrongful conduct. Under the standard enumerated by 
the supreme court, the district court acted improperly in dismissing the action and should, 
therefore, be reversed. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE RUSSELL 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR LACK OF STANDING. 
The Carson Defendants argued below, and the district court ruled, that the Russell 
Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims. There were two bases for this ruling. First, 
the Carson Defendants argued, all claims relating to wrongful conduct belong solely to 
PRP since PRP was the entity that contracted to purchase the Saratoga Lots. (R. at 35-
36.) Second, they argued, Russell lacks standing to individually pursue any claims. (R. 
at 36.) The district court erred in dismissing the Russell Plaintiffs' claims on this basis 
for several reasons. 
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First it required a consideration of documents outside the scope of the pleadings, 
for which there was no foundation and which are inappropriate on a 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss. Second, even were it proper to consider the relevant document - the Purchase 
and Development Agreement (R. at 39-42), the trial court's determination was clearly 
erroneous. The Purchase and Development Agreement states, "PRP agrees to assign to 
Russell all of its right, title and interest in the [PRP] Contract " (Id., emphasis 
added.) "[A]H of [PRP's] right, title and interest in the [PRP] Contract" necessarily 
includes any claims relating to the purchase of the Saratoga Lots referenced in the PRP 
Contract. It is the purchase of those lots and the representations, acts and omissions 
associated with it which form the basis of the Russell Plaintiffs' claims against the Carson 
Defendants. Moreover, the Purchase and Development Agreement grants the same rights 
to Russell individually as to Russell/Packard. Additionally, by virtue of 
Russell/Packard's status as partner in PRP, it has standing to assert the claims as pled. 
The Carson Defendants also argued, and the district court ruled, the Russell 
Plaintiffs were not damaged because PRP purchased each of the Saratoga Lots for 
$30,000 and sold them for $38,000. This argument and ruling was erroneous. The 
Russell Plaintiffs pled they were damaged because PRP purchased them for $30,000 as 
result of the Carson Defendants' wrongful conduct when they were available for 
$25,000. PRP's profit was, therefore, cut as the Russell Plaintiffs alleged. Consequently, 
the district court should be reversed on is dismissal for lack of standing. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE RUSSELL 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR FAILURE ADEQUATELY PLEAD 
FRAUD. 
The Carson Defendants argued, and the district court ruled, the Russell Plaintiffs 
failed to allege any of the Carson Defendants made any misrepresentation directly to 
Plaintiffs. The district court used Pace v. Parish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952) as support 
for its ruling. Pace states that to prove a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, a 
plaintiff must prove the following elements: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew 
to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and 
was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
Id at 274-75 (citing Stuck v. Delta Land & Water Co., 227 P. 791 (Utah 1924); Jones v. 
Pingree, 273 P. 303 (Utah 1928); 23 AM. JUR. 773; 37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 3, p. 215). That is 
undeniably the applicable test for pleading fraud. See, e.g., Brown v. Wanlass, 18 P.3d 
1137 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) ("To plead fraud with particularity, a plaintiff must allege that 
there was 'a false representation of an existing material fact made knowingly or 
recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon, and.. . reasonable reliance 
resulting in the plaintiffs injury."') (quoting DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,443 (Utah 
1995)). There is nothing, however, in that test that requires the fraudulent 
misrepresentation be made directly to a plaintiff. It is sufficient that it is made for the 
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purpose of inducing a plaintiff to act and the plaintiff relies on it to its detriment. Pace 
v. Parish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952). 
Plaintiffs have alleged facts supporting each of the above elements: 1) affirmative 
conduct affirming a presently existing fact (R. at 77 ffif 28-30,35-36,38, 56); 2) falsity 
(Id.); 3) knowledge of falsity (Id.); 4) inducement (R. at 78-79 at ffif 40-44); (5) action in 
reliance (R. at 79 flf 45,47); (6) damages (R. at 83-89 flf 73, 82, 90, 95, 97,103, 111); 
(7) detriment (R. at 80 & 38 ffif 50 & 71); (8) reliance (R. at 79-80 ffil 42-50); and (9) 
reasonableness of reliance (R. at 73, 78, 83 ffif 3, 5, 37, 71.). 
The remaining issues on this claim involved factual determinations that should be 
developed through discovery and decided by a trier of fact. Consequently, the district 
court should be reversed for dismissing the Russell Plaintiffs5 claims on this basis. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE RUSSELL 
PLAINTIFFS* CLAIMS FOR LACK OF A FIDUCIARY 
RELATIONSHIP. 
Bustos additionally argued, and the trial court ruled, he never acted as any type of 
agent in PRP's purchase of the underlying Saratoga Lots and that without such a 
relationship, he owed the Russell Plaintiffs no duties. The only claims in the Russell 
Plaintiffs' complaint that require the existence of such a relationship are for breach of 
fiduciary duty and breach of principal agency relationship. Neither of these two claims 
are made against Bustos. The remaining claims do not require the existence of an agency 
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relationship and there was no proof to the contrary, either factual or caselaw. Therefore, 
the district court's order of dismissal on this basis should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Russell Plaintiffs respectfully request that the 
Court reverse the trial court's dismissal of their Complaint and remand the case for 
further proceedings in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this < 5 < k y of January, 2003. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Michael"JR. Carlston 
R.^ 3rei>rStephens 
Heather S. White 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on April 29, 2002) 
THE COURT: Good morning, counsel. This is the time 
set for hearing on the various motions — or the motions to 
dismiss in the matter of Russell Packard Development, et cetera 
vs. Carson, case No. C-01854. Counsel, state your appearances 
for the record. 
MR. STEPHENS: Brent Stephens and Heather White for 
the plaintiffs, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
MR. MEADE: Keith Meade for defendant Joel Carson. 
MR. PRATT: George Pratt and Marci Rectenbaugh for 
John Thomas. 
MR. ADAMSON: Craig Adamson and Kevin Jones for 
defendant Bustos. 
THE COURT: Very well, counsel. I've reviewed the 
respective pleadings in this matter, and what we will do is 
hear first from, I assume, Mr. Meade, your memoranda having 
been filed first. Do you intend to bear the laboring oar in 
the argument in this case? 
MR. MEADE: Well, I (inaudible). 
THE COURT: I will then entertain your argument at 
this time, Mr. Meade. You may proceed. 
MR. MEADE: PRP was an entity in which Russell 
Packard, the plaintiff and the defendant, Thomas, were members. 
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1 That entity was dissolved in April of 2001 before this action 
2 was filed. PRP cannot now make a claim. 
3 In the summer of 1996, which is the relevant time 
4 (inaudible) dates (inaudible) there were for Thomas, who was 
5 the member of PRP, looked at these lots which are the subject 
6 of this — or give rise to this lawsuit. He was conceded by 
7 Russell to be the manager of PRP at that time. For various 
8 reasons it was not until November of 1996 after CMT had made 
9 the offer to purchase the lots that John Thomas and PRP decided 
10 to purchase these same lots. By the time Thomas got to the 
11 point where he was willing to buy them, the lots were already 
12 under contract to CMT. 
13 The important thing here is that Thomas was the 
14 manager of PRP, was fully aware of the status of these lots. 
15 Carson was a realtor at the time and had acted as a realtor in 
16 the sale of the lots from the developer, Saratoga, to the 
17 initial purchaser, CMT*. Carson was not a realtor in the second 
18 sale, and in fact, Thomas, who was the manager of PRP, was 
19 himself a real estate broker. 
20 When the lots were sold the second time, and the 
21 plaintiffs have characterized it as a "flip sale," and I don't 
22 care what they call it, but when they were sold a second time 
23 the purchase price was $30,000. Thomas knew that that was the 
24 price and Thomas knew that CMT had purchased lots the first 
25 time around for $25,000. 
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1 Now in April of 1997 Russell and Thomas split the 
2 sheets and that agreement was attached to our motion to 
3 dismiss. At that time Russell purchased the lots, not for 
4 $30,000, but for $38,000 a lot, and he agreed he was taking 
5 those lots, and Thomas kept everything else having to do with 
6 PRP. 
7 There's two other lawsuits in this court pending 
8 involving the same transaction. There is a case, Saratoga 
9 Springs vs. Carson and Bustos. There is another one, Wardley 
10 vs. Carson and Bustos. Those cases have been pending since the 
11 year 2000. 
12 THE COURT: To whom are those cases assigned? 
13 MR. MEADE: One is assigned to Judge Hansen, and one 
14 is assigned to Judge Iwasaki. Larry Russell's has already been 
15 taken in those cases. In June of 2000 Larry Russell entered 
16 into a side deal with Saratoga and Wardley agreeing to 
17 cooperate with them in* their lawsuit against Wardley and 
18 Bustos, and to share in the judgment they got, if any. 
19 Larry Russell's deposition was taken in the other 
20 suits last winter. The plaintiff's claims here are essentially 
21 based on a theory that CMT never existed and that the first 
22 sale was, I guess, a sham is his claim. 
23 The plaintiffs have unusually acknowledged in their 
24 complaint that they knew of the wrongdoing in the Spring of 
25 2000 — the alleged wrongdoing. They don't say exactly when, 
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1 but certainly by June of 2000 when they signed the side deal 
2 with Wardley and Saratoga they knew of the circumstances. The 
3 initial complaint was filed in November of 2001, four and a 
4 half years after the first closing, which occurred in June or 
5 July ~ July of 1997. 
6 What happened was the contract was for the sale of 72 
7 lots, and they were closing in bunches of six. The first 
8 closing didn't occur until July of 1997, which is the date I've 
9 got here. The significance of that is that at that time a deed 
10 was recorded from Saratoga Springs to CMT, and then there was 
11 actually a second closing where there was a sale from CMT to 
12 PRP and another set of recorded deeds there. 
13 Part of our argument in our brief is that the 
14 recording of those deeds, which were of record and in the chain 
15 of Russell's title gives him notice that Saratoga and CMT were, 
16 at least on paper, two separate entities and gave him people he 
17 could call and talk to" if he had questions about that 
18 particular transaction. 
19 Now the complaint alleges a number of causes of action 
20 against Carson and the other defendants. Two, four — five of 
21 those causes of action breach of fiduciary duty, civil 
22 conspiracy, unjust enrichment, breach of a principal agency 
23 relation and intentional interference with prospective economic 
24 relations are all based on — or all have a four year statute 
25 of limitations. There seems to be no disagreement in the 
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1 pleadings that the four-year statute applies to these causes of 
2 action. 
3 Russell acknowledges in his pleadings that he 
4 discovered the wrongdoing in the spring of 2000. It doesn't 
5 really commit — the plaintiffs don't really commit to when the 
6 wrongdoing occurred or when it should be measured from, but if 
7 we give them the benefit of the doubt and argue that it would 
8 start at the first closing, which is July of 1997, which would 
9 be the latest possible date they could have knowledge, then the 
10 four year statute of limitations would have run in July of 
11 2001. 
12 They've argued that the discovery rule applies and 
13 that that tolls the statute of limitations, and I guess that 
14 the statute ought to start when they discovered the wrongdoing 
15 in the spring of 2000. As we discussed in our brief, the 
16 discovery rule — if you discover the wrongdoing before the 
17 statute of limitations applies under that four-year statute, 
18 you'd have the bring the cause of action before the four-year 
19 statute runs. 
20 So in other words, they had to bring their action 
21 between the spring of 2000 and July of 2001. They had over a 
22 year to bring their action, and they didn't do it, and the 
23 statute of limitations has run. The difference there, as we've 
24 discussed, is the statutes that have an internal discovery rule 
25 and those that do not, and that was discussed in the 
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1 BYU/Frandsen case. In other words, if the statute has an 
2 express discovery rule written in the statute as opposed to a 
3 court imposed one where there is an internal discovery rule 
4 stated, then the statute starts to run from the date of 
5 discovery. 
6 This statute does not have the internal discovery 
7 rules, so the four-year statute ran in July of 2001. So all of 
8 those five causes of action, the second, third, fifth, seventh 
9 and eighth are all barred by the statute of limitations. 
10 That rule was applied to this very statute that's at 
11 issue here by the Utah Supreme Court in the Atwood vs. Sterm 
12 case, 823 P.2d 1064, and the facts there are remarkably similar 
13 in terms of dates and discovery, and unless we are going to 
14 rewrite that opinion, these cases — or those causes of action 
15 are barred. 
16 On the fraud claim others are going to address most of 
17 that, and we've tried to break this up. The thing I want to 
18 emphasize from Carson's point of view is that there is not a 
19 single allegation that Carson misrepresented anything to 
20 Russell. 
21 There are a number of paragraphs referred to in the 
22 plaintiff's reply memorandum containing allegations of 
23 misrepresentation, but you can read through each one of 
24 those — and I have done it — and there is nothing in that 
25 that indicates that Carson misrepresented anything to Russell. 
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1 There are allegations that Carson misrepresented things to 
2 Saratoga Springs, but Saratoga Springs is already in court and 
3 we're already at issue with those, and there's no indication 
4 that Russell has any ability to pursue those claims. 
5 Carson was not an agent of the second transaction. In 
6 Russell's deposition at page 73, which he gave in the other 
7 case, he expressly indicated that he did not have any contact 
8 with Carson prior to these contracts being written. 
9 In addition, Thomas knew who CMT was. Again, Thomas 
10 is a manager of PRP. He knew everything about the 
11 transactions, and so there was no misrepresentation by Carson 
12 to PRP, and no contact between Carson and Russell. Maybe 
13 that's why — and the second aspect of this is the lack of 
14 standing, which Mr. Pratt, I understand, will address. 
15 There is another — there has been other litigation 
16 between Mr. Russell and Mr. Thomas in this court, case 
17 98098727. There's been several lawsuits, actually. In that 
18 matter in paragraph 16 of the complaint Mr. Russell alleged 
19 that — in referring to this agreement of April 1997 that we've 
20 attached is that he alleges under that agreement, "Russell 
21 agreed to transfer all interests in PRP, and that neither 
22 Russell nor Russell Packard would have any interest in PRP or 
23 its assets, projects or properties." That's his allegation in 
24 the other matter against his fellow member. So it appears that 
25 he has given up his right to pursue these kinds of claims. 
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1 Anyway, I'll stop there and let others finish the 
2 fraud argument. Thank you. 
3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Meade. 
4 MR. STEPHENS: (inaudible) request for clarification 
5 (inaudible). There were references extraneous to the motion. 
6 We were not (inaudible) to the deposition which (inaudible). 
7 This is a motion to dismiss and not a motion for summary 
8 judgment, so as far as the record is concerned, those matters 
9 that were referred to on some of the record are not before the 
10 Court. 
11 THE COURT: Well, in that regard, Mr. Stephens, there 
12 have been submissions to this Court outside the scope of the 
13 pleading. Consequently, I am viewing this proceeding as a 
14 summary judgment motion, and you have certainly stated your 
15 position, and that's fine. You've protected your position. 
16 Mr. Pratt? 
17 MR. PRATT: Thank you, your Honor. Mr. Meade and I 
18 may have had a little communication mix-up as we discussed how 
19 we might allocate our arguments so as not to be duplicative. I 
20 was not prepared to argue the standing issue, but I understand 
21 that Mr. Adamson will make that argument, and I don't intend to 
22 touch that one. 
23 I would like to come back first just to emphasize the 
24 arguments that have been made in the briefs on the motion to 
25 dismiss the fraud claim. Your Honor, when the initial 
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complaint was filed and then the amended complaint filed 
afterwards, the defendants had already made the argument that 
the fraud claim was fatally deficient for the simple reason 
that it failed to allege any representation that was made by 
the defendants to the plaintiff. 
After having had the opportunity to review that 
simple, and I would say fundamental argument about the defect 
in the fraud claim when the amended complaint was filed, the 
first claim for relief for fraud is identical. Not one word 
was changed, so one must assume that that's the best allegation 
that the plaintiffs are able to make on this fraud claim. 
One will review the first cause of action, and indeed 
the entire complaint, and find absolutely no allegation 
anywhere that any of the defendants made any representation to 
the plaintiffs. The only representation — the fraud claim is 
found at page 11 beginning with paragraph 63. If you look at 
paragraph 65, that is the representation that is alleged as 
part of this fraud claim, and the representation is that 
defendants represented to Saratoga — not the plaintiffs — 
Saratoga being the seller, not the plaintiff/buyers of this 
property. Defendants represented to Saratoga that CMT was part 
of, affiliated with or owned by plaintiffs. 
No allegation that any representation was made by 
plaintiffs that plaintiffs relied on as a basis for doing 
anything that's alleged in the complaint. 
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1 If you look then at paragraph 71, construing the 
2 pleading liberally, given every benefit to the doubt — benefit 
3 of the doubt to the plaintiffs in the way this has been 
4 pleaded, paragraph 71 says, "The plaintiffs reasonably relied 
5 upon the acts and conduct of defendants to plaintiff's 
6 detriment and damage," Even there still, they're not alleging 
7 that they relied on any representation that was made by 
8 plaintiffs. They're just saying that they relied on 
9 unspecified — really anywhere in the whole pleading — acts 
10 and conduct. They don't allege that they reasonably relied on 
11 any representation. 
12 THE COURT: You're referring to representation 
13 allegedly made by the defendants rather than the plaintiffs. 
14 MR. PRATT: Correct. 
15 THE COURT: The plaintiffs presumably failed to 
16 allege, in your judgment, sufficient statements in the 
17 complaint to the effect that they have relied on 
18 misrepresentation made by the defendants. 
19 MR. PRATT: To the plaintiffs. 
20 THE COURT: To the plaintiffs. 
21 MR. PRATT: Correct, 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Either I misheard you or I think 
23 you misstated— 
24 MR. PRATT: I probably mis-spoke. 
25 THE COURT: Certainly it is the defendants who are 
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1 present in this case against whom allegations apply are made, 
2 MR, PRATT: Correct, 
3 THE COURT: All right. 
4 1 MR. PRATT: And again, in case I have misspoken, your 
5 Honor, the point here is that there is nothing in the 
6 complaint, either within the language of the first cause of 
7 action or anywhere else in the complaint, where there's an 
8 allegation that the defendants made any representation to the 
9 plaintiffs. It's just not there. 
10 We don't know what those statements are. They haven't 
11 been alleged. They've had two opportunities to plead any such 
12 statements now, and they're simply not in the pleadings. 
13 Again, if you wanted to construe the pleading 
14 liberally, looking at paragraph 71, that's the closest you can 
15 even conceptually get to the proposition that maybe there is 
16 some allegation of what the defendant said to the plaintiffs. 
17 All they say is that they relied on acts and conduct of 
18 defendants, not on any statements. There are no statements in 
19 the complaint that are alleged that were made to the 
20 plaintiffs. 
21 Again, I'm getting a little bit theoretical here, but 
22 assuming that you might say that this unspecified acts and 
23 conduct were somehow the representation that's necessary to be 
24 made to the plaintiffs to constitute an element of their cause 
25 of action, we don't know what the acts or the conduct is. 
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1 Under Rule 9(b), this is the type of thing in a fraud 
2 claim that is supposed to be stated with particularity. The 
3 pleading should state exactly what it was that was stated to 
4 the plaintiffs, when it was said, the circumstances and so 
5 forth, and that just simply is not to be found in the 
6 complaint. 
7 There's been two opportunities to plead that, and I 
8 think we must assume, because number one, the plaintiffs' 
9 counsel are experienced lawyer, and because they've had two 
10 opportunities to plead this that there simply is not a Rule 11 
11 basis to plead any representation that was made by the 
12 defendants to the plaintiffs that they relied on. It's just 
13 not in the pleading. 
14 I'd like to just address briefly the statute of 
15 limitations argument, your Honor, and this has been briefed and 
16 Mr. Meade has already addressed it, but I wanted to again draw 
17 the Court's attention to the Atwood against Sterm Ruger and 
18 Company case, which as Mr. Meade mentioned, is strikingly 
19 similar to the case before this Court. 
20 One of the things I love about this case is it's only 
21 about a page long, and yet the dispositive facts and the 
22 holding are very, very clear. 
23 In this case the plaintiff was injured by a gun 
24 manufactured by the defendant in an accident that didn't 
25 involve anyone but the plaintiff. The gun went off and hurt 
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1 him. 
2 Some time later he went in to see a lawyer and said, 
3 "You know, I—" the lawyer told him that he may have a basis to 
4 file a suit here because I've read some things about this 
5 particular gun — the lawyer happened to know about guns, and 
6 there may be some negligence in the manufacture of this 
7 particular gun that hurt you. 
8 After that, the lawsuit got filed — and that 
9 happened — that information came to the plaintiff's attention 
10 that he may have the basis to file a lawsuit, knew all of the 
11 facts necessary to inform him that a lawsuit was available to 
12 him — a claim against the defendant. He learned of that in 
13 the spring of 1988, but he didn't file his lawsuit until four 
14 years and two days after the injury had occurred. 
15 So he made the argument, which is the exact same 
16 argument — in other words, it was time barred unless he gets 
17 the benefit of some type of tolling because it was a four year 
18 statute of limitations, clearly measured from the date of the 
19 injury. He argued just as the defendants are arguing here that 
20 he should get the benefit of the discovery rule that's been 
21 talked about in a lot of the Utah cases, and that the statute 
22 of limitations should not begin to run at all until the time he 
23 learned about the injury, which was about five or six months — 
24 coincidentally, just about the same time period that's 
25 applicable here, and I'll get to that in a moment — five or 
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1 six months before the four-year statute would run. 
2 Unfortunately, the plaintiff had waited until four 
3 years and two days until the lawsuit was filed, and so he 
4 argued that under the discovery rule, the statute of 
5 limitations should not begin to run until three and a half 
6 years, approximately, after the injury occurred but when he 
7 first became aware that he had the basis to file a lawsuit. 
8 The Court said no, under these circumstances, because 
9 he learned of the existence of the cause of action five or six 
10 months before that four-year statute would have run, you don't 
11 get the benefit of afty discovery rule when you learn of the 
12 existence of the cause of action before the statute of 
13 limitations runs. You've got the obligation to file your claim 
14 within that four year statute of limitations. 
15 Listen to the language of the Court. It's very, very 
16 clear on page 1065, and it's 823 P.2d, a 1992 case. "While the 
17 discovery rule has often been applied to give a plaintiff the 
18 opportunity to file his action after learning of certain 
19 critical facts, the discovery rule has no application here. We 
20 held in Briqham Young University v. Falsom Construction—" one 
21 of the cases mentioned by Mr. Meade — "that the discovery rule 
22 does not apply to a plaintiff who becomes aware of his injuries 
23 or damages and a possible cause of action before the statute of 
24 limitations expires." 
25 Then the Court says, "Plaintiff concedes that he 
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1 learned of a potential legal cause of action in the spring of 
2 1988," which is when he talked to the lawyer who said, "You 
3 know, you may have a lawsuit here," "which would be several 
4 months before the expiration of the statute of limitations. He 
5 does not suggest any reason why the action could not have been 
6 filed between the spring of 1988 and October 11th of that 
7 year," which would have been the four years from the time of 
8 the injury had taken place. 
9 So if you apply that holding — and that is the law in 
10 the State of Utah — to our facts here, the injury, according 
11 to plaintiff's complaint, was in November 1996 when this 
12 alleged flip-sale purchase took place, and the defendants 
13 allegedly skimmed this $5,000 piece out of the purchase price. 
14 What the plaintiffs now allege in their amended 
15 complaint very explicitly, your Honor, is that they became 
16 aware, coincidentally, in the spring of the year 2000 that 
17 there was wrongdoing in connection, according to them, with 
18 this transaction that occurred in November of 1996. 
19 Well, that was the spring of 2000. They still have 
20 five or six months before the four-year statute that's 
21 applicable to virtually all the claims at issue in this case 
22 would run. Under reasoning of the Atwood case, it's just 
23 absolutely crystal clear that plaintiffs have the obligation 
24 because they discovered the existence of the cause of action 
25 long before the running of the four year statute of 
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limitations, which would have been in November 2000. They had 
from the spring to November to file this complaint, but they 
didn't do it until November of 2001. 
They get absolutely no benefit under the Atwood case 
or the Brigham Young University case, other cases that have 
been cited by Mr. Meade in his memorandum, of the discovery 
rule here because they discovered the existence of the cause of 
action five, six, maybe seven months, depending on exactly what 
is meant by the spring, as alleged in their amended complaint. 
They discovered it that much before the time the four-year 
statute runs. The case law is absolutely clear they get no 
benefit of any tolling. They were bound to that four year 
statute of limitations. That's why all of the claims based on 
the four year statute of limitations are time barred. That's 
all I have, your Honor. 
THE COURTS All right. Mr. Pratt, thank you. 
Mr. Adamson? 
MR. ADAMSON: May it please the Court, counsel, I 
don't propose to reargue what Mr. Meade and Mr. Pratt have 
argued, your Honor, but only to indicate to you the difference. 
There are two things. One is the difference between Mr. Bustos 
and everybody else in this case. 
Mr. Bustos is a real estate agent, and he — and the 
allegations against Mr. Bustos are one step further removed 
than everybody else. He made no representations, he's claimed 
18 
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1 to have no duty to make any representations, or no duty to any 
2 of these people on the plaintiff's side. He is in this because 
3 of some fairly indistinct claim of conspiracy resulting from 
4 the fact that in the end he got some of the money. 
5 He had no part in the sales, no part in the 
6 transactions whatsoever. He had no dealings whatever with PRP. 
7 It is alleged here that he had — that there was a debt back 
8 and forth between him and Mr. Thomas. 
9 In the cases before Judge Iwasaki and Judge Hansen the 
10 evidence is different than that, but — and there is an 
11 acknowledgement that there are debts owed, but that they become 
12 owed at a later time. 
13 I think the — but on the state of the pleadings here, 
14 that is the extent of the claims against Bustos, that he's 
15 entered into some conspiracy, that he ended up with money, and 
16 that somehow Thomas owed him money and he is therefore a 
17 defendant in this action. 
18 The fact of the matter is that the claims here should 
19 be time barred simply because A) of the internal — or the 
20 statute of limitations. The three-year claims are even more, 
21 in my mind, even more difficult to sustain because they are all 
22 claims where what — where the test is, when would a reasonable 
23 person acting under the information that was available to them 
24 have gotten notice. 
25 Well, the first time they would have gotten notice was 
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1 when the deeds were recorded. They had bought from somebody, 
2 they knew from that moment that somebody existed. They could 
3 have asked questions, and a reasonable person who was involved 
4 in this transaction simply would have done so. 
5 To pass that and to go on to where I really was 
6 coming from for this argument, your Honor, if you will go to 
7 Mr. Meade's original motion, you will see attached to it the 
8 contract under which PRP separated from the plaintiffs in this 
9 action. The paragraphs that have something to do with why we 
10 are here today are paragraphs two and three. 
11 Premier Homes LC really is not someone or an entity 
12 that any of the defendants had anything to do with. They all 
13 worked for PRP, if they had anything to do with it at all. 
14 Now of course, that's somewhat untrue of Mr. Russell, 
15 because he was part of PRP. With respect to Bustos and Carson, 
16 at least, Bustos and Carson had, if anything to do at all, they 
17 had to do with a company called PRP. 
18 PRP was later split, and under this contract the 
19 parties split the assets between them. If you look at 
20 paragraph two the remaining entity, PRP, which is the only one 
21 that ever had any dealings with the lots in question here up to 
22 that time, agrees to assign to Russell, who is the plaintiff 
23 here, all of its right, title and interest in the contract and 
24 its right to acquire the Saratoga Springs property at the time 
25 of closing. That's what we're talking about in this case, that 
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1 very contract. 
2 PRP from that moment goes on. That's Russell.. 
3 Russell goes on and he has now sold — or he has now purchased 
4 from PRP the right to buy those lots. 
5 Now if you look at paragraph three, what did Russell 
6 not purchase? He disclaims any interest as a material part of 
7 the consideration of this agreement, Russell and RPI 
8 acknowledge and agree that upon the consummation of the 
9 transaction set forth in this agreement, neither Russell nor 
10 RPI shall have any further interest in and to PRP or any of its 
11 assets, projects or properties. 
12 If the right to file this claim exists at all, it 
13 exists in the company that had the contract in the beginning. 
14 That contract carried with it — those dealings carried with it 
15 everything that Russell now has. Russell purchased from the 
16 company the asset that I've just described to you, and he gave 
17 up the remaining assets. In clear terms he bought the right to 
18 buy the lots, and he left with the entity that he was leaving 
19 all other assets. 
20 I don't see how it can be read that Russell can claim 
21 that he has any more right to any asset, other than the right 
22 to buy the lots, as contracted for, period. 
23 If they had wanted to do that they would have had to 
24 describe causes of actions, things like that. This is cause of 
25 action that existed at the time. Either it was not described 
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1 and left for the remaining assets, which are clearly described. 
2 Everything else other than the right to buy these lots stays 
3 with the company. I can't see any way that the language can be 
4 stretched to read that causes of action that go with the 
5 contract are included. The contract itself and the right to 
6 buy are the assets that Russell purchased. The remainder 
7 stayed with the corporation — or the entity — it's really an 
8 LLC, and that entity has not chosen to bring this action. In 
9 fact, Russell now wants — what the meaning of this action is 
10 that Russell wants to go back and sue the people that he 
11 contracted with to get back some of what he did not retain, and 
12 the Court should not go so far. They have simply no standing 
13 to sue in this case. 
14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Adamson. Let 
15 me interrupt for a moment, Mr. Stephens, before I hear from 
16 your side of the issue. Folks, do you have something you wish 
17 to report? 
18 (Court handles other matter) 
19 THE COURT: Let's now return to the instant matter, 
20 Russell Packard Development. 
21 Mr. Stephens, I'll entertain your comments now. 
22 MR. STEPHENS: Thank you, your Honor. Let me first 
23 start out as to the procedural context that I want to make 
24 clear to the Court as to what my position is. Secondly and 
25 most importantly I want to tell you or the Court what I have, 
-23-
1 and I want to be candid, because if the Court does not think 
2 that I have what is, I think, a common law garden variety fraud 
3 in the classic sense case, then I don't want to go any further. 
4 As to the procedural context, I do believe that it has 
5 to be considered most appropriately under the motion to dismiss 
6 standards. There were attachments made to Meade's affidavit. 
7 There was a code section, there was an agreement, and there was 
8 some warranty deeds. They're irrelevant to my theory of the 
9 case. They're not in affidavit form, but I don't think it 
10 matters. I think that the defendants have treated it as a 
11 motion to dismiss, and we have so treated it as a motion to 
12 dismiss because we filed the first amendment complaint without 
13 leave of court. 
14 So the only thing that would be extraneous to the 
15 pleading is that would make it a motion for summary judgment 
16 are matters of public record or statutes or are irrelevant and 
17 immaterial at this juncture as far as the motions to dismiss 
18 are concerned. So I do think that it's important that the 
19 Court look at it from a motion to dismiss standard, because if 
20 I'm going to lose, I want to lose on the right standard. A 
21 motion for summary judgment would have been handled differently 
22 by me, and I'm sure by the defendants. 
23 With respect to those other proceedings, we were not 
24 parties to those proceedings, except the one claim against our 
25 own partner, which has nothing to do with this case. So this 
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1 is a separate case standing on its own legs separate and apart 
2 from what Wardley is doing or anything else. So this case 
3 should stand or fall as to the case itself, and that would 
4 mean, based upon my procedural context, based upon what I have 
5 pleaded as to well pleaded facts in the first amended 
6 complaint. 
7 I'll — the second part is what I want to do is tell 
8 the Court and the parties what I have, and if I don't have it, 
9 tell me. If I do have it — and I think I do have it, then I'm 
10 entitled to proceed, because what I view this case as is not a 
11 derivative or a hybrid type of case. It sounds in common law 
12 fraud. 
13 There are claims of breaches of fiduciary duties 
14 because of the parties' relationships. I have what I consider 
15 to be a fraud-fraud type of case. What I have pleaded, and I 
16 think that it has to be accepted for the purposes of this case 
17 is true, is this fact,, and that is the people that I represent, 
18 Packard Russell and Mr. Russell were California real estate 
19 developers, particularly Russell, and he comes into Utah in 
20 1996 and wants to develop property in Utah. 
21 So in order to do that, and knowing that he has to be 
22 familiar with the Utah climate, he affiliates with John Thomas, 
23 one of the defendants, who has experience in the real estate 
24 area. Thomas and Packard form an entity known as PRP in 1996 
25 to start looking at business opportunities in Utah to develop 
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1 property. 
2 That brings us to 1996, fall of 1996 where that entity 
3 called PRP looks at 72 lots at Saratoga Springs, and Thomas is 
4 the leg person for Russell. Russell is back in California; 
5 Thomas is actively pursuing it (inaudible) the managing partner 
6 of the LC. 
7 Thomas sees the 72 lots and then tells Russell about 
8 the 72 lots, and this is all contained in the pleadings, and 
9 then Russell becomes interested in the 72 lots, does design 
10 work based upon his outside consultants for this, and the 
11 design work is very important because it's the first phase of 
12 Saratoga Springs. It's not — it's multi — or it's high 
13 density housing, and the Saratoga Springs developer, which is 
14 Wardley or Saratoga Springs Development, I guess it was called, 
15 owned in part by Wardley, wants to have (inaudible). 
16 So they liked the plans that are presented by Russell 
17 through Thomas, and they are sold on it. They had several 
18 people compete about the 72 lots, since they were in the — 
19 since they were in the beginning portion of the development; 
20 they wanted it to look good. So we go and the develop — or 
21 the seller plat developer and the actual building developer 
22 become interested in each other in 1996. 
23 So the agent for the plat developer or seller, either 
24 for Saratoga Springs or for Wardley — a guy by the name of Dan 
25 Carrey — and we hire — and that is Thomas, our fiduciary co-
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manager — hires Carson, another defendant, who becomes our 
real estate agent• 
So we have Thomas as fiduciary and agent for PRP, and 
we have now Carson as agent, and assuming that agents have 
duties that are akin to fiduciary relationships, Carson now 
owns duties of that type to PRP. 
Bustos comes in and Thomas owes Bustos, who is also a 
Wardley real estate agent, significant sums of money based upon 
information, I believe, when we doing a lot of due diligence in 
the 2000-2001 time period to determine that. 
Thomas and Bustos' relationship go way back, and 
Thomas owes Bustos what we understand to be, or (inaudible) 
understand to be significant sums of money. Carson, of course, 
knows Bustos because Bustos and Carson are co-agents in the 
Wardley organization. 
So Russell and Russell Packard, who is now part of the 
PRP entity, doing most of their work in California, likes the 
idea, Saratoga Springs likes the idea, and so Russell tells 
Carson — or rather Thomas — to proceed with the deal in 1996 
with Saratoga. In fact, Carson and Thomas, it is alleged, 
introduce Russell one-on-one with Wardwell, the person, because 
apparently realtors and developers like to meet people face-to-
face. They do a lot of stuff and they like to stare the seller 
into the eye and buyer into the eye, and they're always — and 
they have several meetings. They're always introduced by 
26 
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1 Carson and Thomas as Saratoga or Wardwell as a seller or the 
2 plat developer, and they always introduce Russell as the 
3 builder or the contractor or the buyer• 
4 I So we have face-to-face meetings between Wardwell on 
5 the one hand and Russell on the other hand, and Wardwell likes 
6 Russell's plans— 
7 THE COURT: When you say Wardwell, are you referring 
8 to Wardley? 
9 MR. STEPHENS: Wardley, I'm sorry. 
10 THE COURT: Wardley, okay. 
11 MR. STEPHENS: Wardley, not Wardwell. Wardley, who 
12 was a broker/principal for Wardley real estate, but actually 
13 met Mr. Wardley personally. So they're meeting face-to-face, 
14 introduced by Carson and Thomas. They like the deal and so in 
15 October/November the principal, Russell, tells Thomas to run 
16 with it. Let's get it tied up and let's go. 
17 Now in the interim, say in late October, Thomas, 
18 Carson and Bustos figure out a scheme where they can make an 
19 easy 5K a plot or plat times 72, and they use their connections 
20 with Carrey, who was Wardley's agent. Carrey knows Carson and 
21 Thomas as Russell's agents, and Carrey agrees to sell to 
22 Russell each lot for 25K per lot in 1996. 
23 Carrey and Wardley both think that they're dealing 
24 with Russell. Russell thinks that he's dealing with Wardley 
25 and Saratoga. So Saratoga and Carson and Thomas enter into a 
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purchase and sale agreement — one of the real estate contracts 
that's a form contract. They enter into it, and the entity 
that they sell it to is Saratoga to CMT. That occurs on 
November 4, and on November 8 Russell thinks he closes the deal 
by tying it up through the real estate contract by buying them 
for 30K a lot times 72. 
Both think — that is Wardley thinks and Russell 
thinks that CMT are each other's agents. This is not uncommon. 
Very often developers and builders always try to — in fact, 
they often create special entities to buy large plats because 
number one, they like the secrecy, and number two, they don't 
want anybody to know who's buying it. So it's not uncommon 
that there would be a different name, such as CMT, on the lot. 
That's not the claim of the fraud, and that, we claim, would 
not give notice to anybody that CMT does not belong to Saratoga 
or is not an agent of Saratoga vis-a-vis Russell and vice 
versa. 
So CMT as an entity means nothing to us. It's the 
meetings and the face-to-face through Carson and Thomas 
facilitated that they're constantly dealing or bringing Wardley 
and Russell together saying, "Here's the builder, here's the 
seller, let's see if we can't do something about the property. 
We'll do something with the property." Russell says, "Let's 
close it." They close it. Saratoga tells Carrey, "Let's close 
it." They close it. 
28 
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1 Thomas, Russell and Bustos put in the straw entity, 
2 CMT, all by their lonesomes in 1996 unbeknownst to Saratoga, 
3 unbeknownst to Wardley, and unbeknownst to Russell, It's a 
4 I straw, fictitious, sham instrumentality use to basically steal 
5 from Wardley and Russell $5,000 times 72. Because it closes to 
6 CMT from the seller on November 4, and the precise terms are 
7 closed vis-a-vis Russell on November 8, 1996 at $30,000. 
8 There's no reason to flip the sale by fiduciaries 
9 unless there's a fraud, and there's a fraud committed by 
10 statements because Thomas and Carson are constantly introducing 
11 Wardley and Russell as seller, buyer, developer, plat 
12 developer. 
13 So we have a fraud committed in 1996. Bustos is 
14 behind it because — we know that because he's instrumental in 
15 forming CMT, and he also gets most of the money out of the 
16 deal. So he becomes part of the principal for the agents who 
17 commit the fraud and introduce the thing. 
18 So I think there's no doubt that we have a quote, 
19 "fraud," quote in 1996 as to both Saratoga and Wardley on the 
20 one hand, and somebody on the other hand as buyer, and that 
21 brings us to the points of the motion to dismiss, and that is, 
22 okay, if we have a fraud in 1996, and I sue everybody in 2001, 
23 why aren't I barred? Because I'm outside of the statute on 
24 fraud, facially, and I'm outside of the statute — four-year 
25 statute on fiduciary duty. 
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So that's the first question is that we have a fraud 
in 1996, I do sue November 30, 2001, and I would be barred by 
the statute of limitations, except for the fact that we have 
pleaded two specific elements as to both the fraud items and 
fiduciary items that we say causes the statute not to run — 
not to run until 2000, based upon two principles. 
One, under the fraud statute we have discovery of the 
rule, which is stated in the statute itself. We also have the 
fraudulent concealment exception, which is pleaded 
specifically. Again, we're dealing with the motion to dismiss. 
So I have — and the third exception to the running of the 
statute of limitations to round it out is special 
circumstances, and we don't claim special circumstances, but we 
do claim, and we do plead discovery and fraudulent concealment, 
which if pled properly, will cause the statute of limitations 
not even to begin to run as to those claims until 2000, which 
permits me as to answer the fraud claim, to have filed it in 
2003, and breach claim in 2004. 
These — the best iteration of how these discovery 
rules apply in specific context, that is both the discovery 
rule for fraud, which tolls the statute of limitations until 
discovery and the statute doesn't begin to run, and the 
fraudulent concealment are stated by that great American Juris, 




1 He says as follows — maybe it was Paul's decision. 
2 It sounds like Hall. I don't know. It's Beranda 914 P.2d 445, 
3 and he says, "Generally—" this is the Utah Supreme Court's 
4 latest pronouncement on what they do with fraudulent 
5 concealment and discovery. "Generally a cause of action 
6 accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to 
7 complete cause of action. However, in certain instances the 
8 discovery rule may operate to toll the period of limitations 
9 until the discovery of facts forming a basis for the cause of 
10 action," blah, citing Walker Drug. 
11 It says that in Utah you have to apply this, and they 
12 specifically state that for the trial Courts to do this — I 
13 love this because they're always doing this is they have — 
14 they're so fact specific that you cannot enunciate very well a 
15 general rule when you apply discovery where it is founded by a 
16 statute or a fraudulent concealment where it is pleaded. 
17 In fact, it states, "For the reasons described in 
18 Pena, we decline to adopt any of the subrules mentioned above." 
19 The subrules are (inaudible) so that trial courts can ease 
20 their burden and throw people like me out of court. They 
21 refuse to adopt that. "We leave as the law the general rule 
22 that a plaintiff must make a prima facia showing of the 
23 fraudulent concealment, and then demonstrate that, given the 
24 defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have 
25 discovered his or her claim earlier. 
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"The application of this legal rule to any particular 
set of facts is necessarily a matter left to trial courts and 
finders of fact." They punt, but they properly (inaudible) on 
this one, and that is the Supreme Court. 
We have alleged that we have a fraud in 1996, and we 
have alleged that we didn't discover it in 2000 until the final 
take down of the last 12 lots where someone in Saratoga's 
organization is going through the paperwork — and we plead 
this. He's a controller type, and says to Larry Wardley — is 
that his name? 
MS. WHITE: Russell. 
MR. STEPHENS: Russell Wardley. 
MS. WHITE: Russell Lynn Wardley. 
MR. STEPHENS: Lynn Wardley, Larry Russell. Russell 
is my client and Wardley is the other guy. This controller 
type, whose name I think is mentioned in the complaint, asks 
Wardley, "Who's this CMT organization," and Wardley says, 
"That's Russell's company." 
Anyway, Wardley talks with Russell, and Russell talks 
with Wardley, and they each ask each other, "Who is CMT? Isn't 
he yours, isn't he ours?" Wardley says, "Hell, no," and 
Russell says, "Hell, no." So the discovery of the fraud 
doesn't occur until the year 2000; discovery commences the 
running of the statute. 
We've also pled fraudulent concealment because the 
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1 fraudulent concealment is absolutely necessary for Thomas and 
2 Carson• Thomas continues to work for Russell after the sale. 
3 Carson actually is the agent who does not only the sale from 
4 Saratoga to CMT, he has the guts enough to do the sale from CMT 
5 to PRP. So he gets two commissions on the sale and continues 
6 as agent for PRP. 
7 So I have now standing — I have fraud and I have 
8 standing — I have the statute of limitations fixed. The only 
9 other question then becomes standing. That gets me to the 
10 plain pleading contained in the complaint, and that is PRP 
11 dissolves shortly thereafter — not for this reason but for 
12 other reasons, but that we, as we pleaded in the complaint, 
13 that as to the splitting of the sheets between Russell on the 
14 one hand and Thomas on the other hand as to PRP, Thomas takes 
15 certain assets, Russell and his company take certain assets. 
16 But as to those 72 lots, those lots and all right, title and 
17 interest therein by assignment go to the plaintiffs. Those— 
18 THE COURT: Now you're referring to the agreement 
19 attached to the motion to dismiss. 
20 MR. STEPHENS: We were not referring to that 
21 agreement. We were — that was part of it, but there is a 
22 total assignment as to the — we plead that there is an 
23 assignment of all right, title and interest, which includes the 
24 claim of fraud that's later discovered that goes to Russell. 
25 THE COURT: So when you're referring to the language, 
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"right, title and interest in," you're not specifically talking 
about the paragraph that's pointed out to me in the agreement• 
MR. STEPHENS: I am not specifically, no. I am 
relying, in part, upon that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STEPHENS: Because assignments can occur in many 
ways, and assignments can occur by a variety of vehicles, and 
assignments can occur in parcels, that is we did get all right, 
title and interest to the 72 lots, and also PRP in winding up 
has the ability in and of itself to take chose of action. 
Since PRP is no longer in existence, the person or the assignee 
who takes that parcel and finds later a chose in action or a 
claim for relief through the assignee winding up process 
pursuant to an opinion by Judge Billings, that winding up, even 
of a dissolved corporation, has the ability to prosecute the 
claim. 
So I think we have it either under a winding up 
equitable theory or under an assignment theory, but that has 
been pleaded because someone has the — if we have a claim for 
fraud and the statute of limitations hasn't run — which I 
don't think it has — someone has to have the ability to bring 
the claim or the chose in action. The person that I think is 
the appropriate person would be Russell Packard Development and 
Lawrence Russell through assignment. 
Or alternatively, it could be pleaded if the Court 
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1 were unsure about the right, title and interest language, among 
2 other things, it could be Russell Packard Development and 
3 Lawrence Russell as the entity in charge of winding up and 
4 dissolving the PRP entity for the purposes of the 72 lots. 
5 There has to be some entity or some creation of an 
6 entity to bring it because the chose in action is not — and 
7 according the Utah Supreme Court or the Utah court of appeals, 
8 if it was a Billings opinion, does not end by the winding up 
9 and dissolution of the corporation, but continues on— 
10 THE COURT: It doesn't end — and I'm not disagreeing 
11 with your analysis of the state and the law. My question 
12 simply, though, had to do with is there another freestanding 
13 assignment document which would assign from PRP to your clients 
14 any causes of action they may have. That would seem to me to 
15 bear directly upon the standing question. 
16 MR. STEPHENS: It would. 
17 THE COURT: And that's why. I'm— 
18 MR. STEPHENS: There would be other materials that we 
19 could present as to standing. We are relying certainly in part 
20 upon the fact that Russell ended up with all right, title and 
21 interest to the 72 lots. It would not be the only document or 
22 evidence presented on the issue of standing, or legal theory, 
23 for that matter, because we have a winding up theory and a 
24 verifying theory. 
25 So standing is — yeah, I'm relying in part upon that 
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1 document, but I pled assignment. Somebody has to plead it. 
2 For purposes of the context, I think my standing is good, and I 
3 think it will stand up as well. 
4 I So I do have fraud. I think I've got discovery and 
5 tolling, and if I've got a problem with assignment, then I 
6 better find that out very quickly, but I've got it in the 
7 pleading, and I've got it — and I think I've got it. 
8 1 So as to the context of fraud I have it, I think. On 
9 the context of statute of limitations, I've got it, and on 
10 standing, which I think the Court is perhaps rightfully 
11 skeptical about, I have it, though, pleaded in this context it 
12 has to be a fact that is well pleaded and wouldn't be a basis 
13 for a motion to dismiss at this juncture anyway. 
14 Again, that's my theory of the case. I think I have 
15 it. It's a motion to dismiss for all factual purposes. It was 
16 treated as a motion to dismiss, and that's my theory of the 
17 case. If I've got it 1 should be able to plead it if I don't, 
18 toss me and we'll go someplace else. 
19 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Stephens. I'll 
20 entertain responding statements. I guess, Mr. Meade, you 
21 first. 
22 I guess I'm a little concerned about the procedural 
23 question that's been raised by Mr. Stephens, that is your 
24 motion to dismiss, Mr. Meade, did contain attachments which 



























motion to dismiss I must decide the merits of your respective 
motions on the basis of what was actually pled before me, that 
is the pleadings (inaudible) the pleadings. 
If, on the other hand, I'm to consider the attachments 
that you've submitted, then of course, I'm faced with this 
dilemma about the summary judgment motion, if indeed I treat it 
as a summary judgment motion, I guess there may be some 
distinction in how to respond to it from Mr. Stephen's 
perspective. 
MR. STEPHENS: And just for the record, it would be 
clear that we've — the attachments we thought were — we 
didn't care about them because they are what they are. They're 
not even in affidavit form, but if we're going to be treated as 
a 56(f) affidavit based upon standing, and the standing issue 
was such that the only thing I had was that document, which it 
doesn't say, then I would treat it differently because I would 
add it — I would do my own affidavits, and also do a 56(f) if 
I thought it necessary; but standing, if that's the concern, I 
would have additional evidence outside the record. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Meade, go ahead. 
MR. MEADE: Well, let me respond to the easiest point 
first. On the five causes of action that we've identified 
are covered by the four-year rule, the Beranda case that 
Mr. Stephens has talked about addressed a statute 78-12-27, and 
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1 that has an internal discovery rule, which is the 
2 distinguishing factor that we addressed, and the Beranda case 
3 is not — has nothing to do with the statute — the four-year 
4 statute that's before the Court on these other cases. 
5 The Supreme Court — and this is exactly what 
6 the statute said, by its own terms that statute, which was 
7 78-12-27, does not begin to run until the discovery by the 
8 agreed party of the facts upon which the liability accrued. 
9 That's the language of the statute. That's not a Court imposed 
10 discovery rule. 
11 So the Beranda case is not applicable to this 
12 circumstance, and the Sterm and Atwood case that both Mr. Pratt 
13 and I spoke about is applicable, and those five causes of 
14 action are absolutely time barred. 
15 That has nothing to do with anything outside of the 
16 pleadings, because they have alleged in their complaint that 
17 they discovered in the spring of 2000. They have alleged in 
18 their complaint that the sale occurred in November of 1996. So 
19 those causes ought to go. 
20 Now on the fraud claim, the three-year statute, the 
21 only documents that are — and all of the documents that we're 
22 dealing with were attached to our initial memorandum. I mean 
23 it wasn't something we filed in our reply. I didn't hear any 
24 complaining in Mr. Russell's reply to our motion about these 
25 particular documents, and I don't think there's a dispute that 
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these are genuine documents. Mr. Stephens' point seems to be 
that maybe there are documents beyond this assignment, but the 
deeds — they are not certified copies, but they are clearly 
copies of recorded instruments, and there was no complaint 
about them. If there had been, I would have filed something to 
buttress them. They are from the first closing in July of 
1997. 
They clearly reflect the chain of title from Saratoga 
to CMT, and then a separate deed from CMT to Russell Packard. 
CMT deed is signed by C. Perez as president of CMT Developing. 
Our point is that at that juncture, July of 1997, when 
this first closing took place, Mr. Russell was on notice that 
there were at least two steps in the chain of title from the 
developer to him. If he believed that the developer was his 
grantor, he at least had a duty to ask them questions about why 
we have two deeds. 
There was no -- and the fact that there are two deeds 
like this I mean absolutely destroys the myth that there was 
some desire to hide something. These are of record matters, 
and it's of record in the chain of title that Russell was 
taking. 
Our point is that at this point in time, July of 1997, 
he's on notice, and the statute runs from that point forward. 
He's over a year late in filing the fraud cause of action 
because the statute would run three years from the date he 
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should have discovered — as a reasonable person should have 
discovered. So by July of 2000 his fraud claim is time barred. 
On the standing argument, if the Court, you know, is 
not inclined to look at this agreement solely on the assignment 
issue, there is another aspect of the agreement that doesn't 
seem to be in disagreement, and that's the notion that Russell 
didn't buy these lots for $30,000 a lot from PRP. He actually 
paid $38,000 per lot. There's nothing in the pleadings or 
otherwise to suggest that the price would have been any 
different. 
In other words, another element of fraud is injury or 
damage. If he's already agreed to pay far more than what he 
claims the $30,000 — or the $25,000 price, I mean I don't see 
where there's a damage that follows. So for those reasons, I 
think the Court can dismiss all of these causes of action. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Meade. 
Mr. Pratt, just briefly I'll hear from you. 
MR. PRATT: Your Honor, I think whatever reference 
there has been to extraneous materials only potentially impacts 
the standing argument. I believe that the motions to dismiss 
on failure to state a fraud claim and on the statute of 
limitations can be resolved right out of the pleadings on 
12(b)(6), which is the way we had intended to present this, and 




1 First on fraud, your Honor, I challenged anyone in the 
2 courtroom to find where there is an allegation in the amended 
3 complaint of a representation of any type made to the 
4 plaintiffs. 
5 Mr. Stephens spoke at some length about the dealings 
6 between the parties, but he did not — as I would have if I was 
7 responding to that argument — pick up the complaint and say, 
8 "Here's where we made that essential allegation to support a 
9 fraud claim against the plaintiffs." The reason he didn't do 
10 that but spoke about other things is because it simply is not 
11 there. There is no allegation here that the defendants said 
12 anything to the plaintiffs upon which the plaintiffs relied, 
13 and therefore the fraud claim just has —• there is no fraud 
14 claim that's been stated. 
15 On the statute of limitations, Mr. Stephens made 
16 reference to the Beranda against Langford case, the 1996 
17 decision from the Supreme Court, in an effort to demonstrate 
18 that this is a highly fact dependant, fact specific area, that 
19 there may be some factual determination that would have to be 
20 made that would preclude a dismissal of the claims at this 
21 time. 
22 The language that Mr. Stephens quoted from states the 
23 question of when a plaintiff, when there is an allegation that 
24 the defendants have fraudulently concealed the existence of a 
25 cause of action, when the plaintiff in that scenario should 
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1 become alerted that he has a cause of action and thus there is 
2 a discovery of a cause of action is fact specific. 
3 The Court says, "When a defendant has concealed a 
4 plaintiff's cause of action, the question of when a plaintiff 
5 should reasonably begin inquiring about the defendant's 
6 wrongdoing and whether once on notice the plaintiff has acted 
7 with reasonable diligence to discover the facts forming the 
8 basis of the cause of action are all highly fact dependant 
9 legal questions." 
10 We don't have to get into that question at all, your 
11 Honor, because the plaintiff's complaint absolutely 
12 unequivocally resolves what otherwise I suppose might have been 
13 a fact question that would have to be resolved before this 
14 Court. 
15 In the amended complaint in a specific portion of the 
16 complaint, with the heading, "Concealment of the facts and to 
17 discovery by defendants—" I think they mean plaintiffs, if you 
18 look at paragraph 55. It says, "Plaintiffs did not discover—" 
19 and this is the essence of the fraud that's being alleged, of 
20 the whole scam that's being alleged. "Plaintiffs did not 
21 discover that CMT was not the agent for, under the control of, 
22 owned by or otherwise acting for Saratoga in connection with 
23 the sale of the lots until spring of 2000 when an accountant 
24 saw some things that alerted him that there was wrongdoing." 
25 Down at 59 it's stated again, "This affirmative 
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1 conduct in concealment of the defendants constitute a 
2 pattern — constituted a pattern during October and November 
3 1996 during the sale, and continued thereafter through spring 
4 of 2000 that CMT was not only the plaintiff Saratoga's agent or 
5 company, et cetera." Last sentence, "The active concealment 
6 continued until spring of 2000 by the defendants." 
7 That's the type of issue that might be fact dependant, 
8 but it's not fact dependant here because the plaintiffs have 
9 expressly admitted that they were aware of the facts giving 
10 rise to this cause of action specifically in the spring of 
11 2000, and under the Sterm/Ruger case, and also under the 
12 Beranda case — this very case — that means that because the 
13 four-year statute would not run from — until November 2000, 
14 four years after the alleged fraud took place in November of 
15 1996, they had five or six months to bring a claim, and the 
16 discovery rule doesn't help them. 
17 Right in the Beranda case at page 55, your Honor, 
18 quoting the Atwood case that I cited from more extensively 
19 before, the Court reiterates, "The discovery rule does not 
20 apply to a plaintiff who becomes aware of his injuries or 
21 damages and a possible cause of action before the statute of 
22 limitations expires." 
23 Plaintiffs admit in their pleading they became aware 
24 of all the facts that support this cause of action in the 
25 spring of 2000. The statute of limitations would not expire 
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for another five or six months. Under both the Atwood case and 
the Beranda case, they simply do not meet the tests, and the 
statute of limitations bars those claims. 
One other thing, your Honor, there is one other motion 
pending before the Court. I did not want that to be 
overlooked. It's a motion that my client, John Thomas, 
initially filed going to the commercial bribery claim, the 
legal merits of that claim. We haven't argued that, and I just 
wanted to make sure that that motion did not get overlooked at 
this hearing. Ms. Rectenbaugh of our firm would be ready to 
handle that. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to allow that one to stand 
on its submissions, counsel. I've reviewed it. That's cause 
of action No. 4, the commercial bribery issue— 
MR. PRATT: Correct. 
THE COURT: I've seen the memoranda — the motion and 
the memoranda as it relates to that issue. 
MR. PRATT: Fair enough. Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: You bet. Thank you, Mr. Pratt. 
Mr. Adamson? 
MR. ADAMSON: Well, I'll try not to belabor this too 
much, your Honor, because we've been here quite awhile. With 
respect to Bustos, I think it's important to go over what we've 
heard here today, and that is there has been no duty alleged. 
There has been no claim that he was a fiduciary, and he is not. 
44 
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1 There has been no claim that he had a duty to tell anybody 
2 anything in this case because he did not. 
3 With respect to the general case, I would only observe 
4 with respect to Mr. Stephens' argument about the corporation 
5 first — or it's a limited liability company, and I keep making 
6 that mistake. I think what he was trying to say is that there 
7 is this document, which by the way, they've known about our 
8 claim that this was dispositive since January 31st. If they 
9 didn't think that we were going to be arguing from that 
10 document they've had since January 31st when we filed our 
11 pleading, which relied heavily on it, to make some comment or 
12 complaint, which hasn't happened, we know of no other document 
13 that assigns the claims. 
14 I believe this is the only document, and what I think 
15 Mr. Stephens is doing is talking about — kind of mixing 
16 concepts here. First of all, if you've got — in this case 
17 you've got a contract between two people that own parts of a 
18 limited liability company. He's calling it split the sheets. 
19 Okay, we've split the sheets or the assets. They take the 
20 assets, they've described what the assets are, they've describe 
21 what the assets are not. I believe that's the only document 
22 there is. 
23 Now the next thing he does is say that it was later 
24 dissolved. Well, it seems to me if we're going to kind of mix 
25 theories here, let's talk about this in terms of a divorce. We 
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have two parties that are an entity, the marriage. We split 
the sheets on this entity, we get a divorce, we no longer have 
a legal entity which we're dealing with. One party got part of 
the assets, the other party got the other. Then the second 
party dies. 
What he wants to do is claim that he's inherited this 
right. There is no legal basis for the claim that once you've 
given up your rights in an entity that if the entity is then 
later dissolved you have some right to inherit those things, 
because otherwise they just disappear. Sometimes they just 
appear. He has no right to do that. 
As far as the fraud in this case goes — the entire 
claim in any case — listen to what Mr. Stephens himself told 
you. While we were closing out this thing in the year 2000, 
one of our own accountants from our own documents found that 
there was something wrong. Does that sound like concealment? 
No, I don't think so, because all they had to do was look at 
their own documents. They had those documents from the very 
first day» 
What have we got, kind of the case of the purloin 
fraud like the purloined letter where we hid the fraud in plain 
sight by recording it? 
Now if they don't have a duty — if the statute on 
recording doesn't give them some help and give them some 
rights, I'd be very surprised. I think they have a duty to 
46 
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1 I read their own documents. I think they have a duty to 
2 understand them. They have a duty to do it timely. If they 
3 just don't do it for three years, that's just too bad. It was 
4 in their capacity to do. Not ours — we didn't hide it. It 
5 was right there, and that's how they found it. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Adamson. I am 
7 persuaded, Mr. Stephens and Ms. White, that the motion — 
8 pending motions to dismiss are well taken, and I'm going to 
9 grant the same for the reasons specified, both here at oral 
10 argument and in the supporting memoranda. 
11 I'll ask counsel for the defendants, the movements, to 
12 prepare the appropriate order and submit it to me. Thank you 
13 for your presentation, folks. We'll be in recess. 




























STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing proceedings were transcribed 
under my direction from the electronic tape recording 
made of these proceedings. 
That this transcript is full, true, and correct 
and contains all of the evidence, all of the 
objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court and all 
matters to which the same relate which were audible 
through said tape recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore the name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the 
speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 2nd day of 
August 2002. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 2004 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
residing in Utah County 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL/PACKARD : MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., et al, 
PIaintiff(s), : CASE NO. 010910854 
vs. : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
JOEL M. CARSON, et al, : Date: June 10,2002 
Defendant(s). : 
After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice to Submit filed June 6,2002, 
the Court rules as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' Objection and Amended Objection to Form of Order of Dismissal are denied 
for the reasons specified in the opposing memoranda. The Order of Dismissal including the 
Complaint and Amended Complaint is executed June 10,2002. 
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Case No. 010910854 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 10th day of June, 20021 sent by first class mail, a true and correct 
copy of the attached document to the following: 
Keith W.Meade 
525 E. First South 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Michael R. Carlston 
R. Brent Stephens 
Heather S. White 
10 Exchange Place, 11* Floor 
PO Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Craig G. Adamson 
370 E. South Temple 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
George W. Pratt 
Marci Rechtenbach 
PO Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-3200 
«C 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Joel M. Carson 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL/PACKARD DEVELOPMENT, 
INC., a California corporation; and 
LAWRENCE M. RUSSELL, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOEL M. CARSON, an individual; 
WILLIAM BUSTOS, an individual; and 
JOHN THOMAS, an individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 010910854 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on Monday, April 29,2002. The plaintiff was 
represented by counsel, R. Brent Stephens and Heather S. White, of SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU. The defendant Carson was represented by Keith W. Meade, of COHNE, RAPPAPORT 
& SEGAL. The defendant Bustos was represented by Craig G. Adamson, of DART ADAMSON & 
DONOVAN. The defendant John Thomas was represented by George W. Pratt and Marci 
Rechtenbach, of JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH. 
The Court, having considered the pleadings filed by the parties directed to the defendants' 
motions to dismiss, and having considered all of those pleadings, as well as the argument of counsel 






IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint be and 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
postage fully prepaid, on the day of , 2002, to the following: 
Michael R. Carlston 
R. Brent Stephens 
Heather S. White 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Craig G. Adamson 
DART. ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
370 East South Temple. Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
George W. Pratt 
Marci Rechtenbach 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
P.O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-3200 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART II. Actions, Venue, Limitation of Actions 
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
ARTICLE 2. OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY 
Copyright (C) 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
-12-25 Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument 
writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for 
y article charged on a store account; also on an open account for work, labor 
services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all of 
e foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within four years after the 
st charge is made or the last payment is received; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections 
Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1) (a), which in specific situations limits the time 
r action to one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5 (1) (b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
2DIT 
story: L. 1951, ch. 58, s 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, s 14; 
J6, ch. 79, s 110. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART II. Actions, Venue, Limitation of Actions 
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
ARTICLE 2. OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY 
Copyright (C) 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
-12-26 Within three years. 
An action may be brought within three years: 
(1) for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; except that when 
ste or trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining 
aim, the cause of action does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved 
rty of the facts constituting such waste or trespass; 
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions 
r specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where the subject of 
e action is a domestic animal usually included in the term "livestock," which 
the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if the animal strayed or 
s stolen from the true owner without the owner's fault, the cause does not 
crue until the owner has actual knowledge of such facts as would put a 
asonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by the defendant; 
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of 
tion in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party 
the facts constituting the fraud or mistake; 
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a 
nalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special 
ses a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state; 
(5) to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except that the cause 
action does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reasonably should 
ow of the harm suffered. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART III. Procedure 
CHAPTER 27. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Copyright (C) 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
1-27-26 Jurisdiction over nonresidents --Only claims arising from enumerated 
:ts may be asserted. 
Only claims arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted against a 
ifendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this act. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9 
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART m . PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
Copr. ° West Group 2002. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 9-15-2002. 
RULE 9. PLEADING SPECIAL MATTERS 
(aXD Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of 
a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized 
association of persons that is made a party. When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal 
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue 
or be sued in a representative capacity, he shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall 
include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge, and on such 
issue the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same on the 
trial. 
(2) Designation of Unknown Defendant. When a party does not know the name of an adverse party, he 
may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party may be designated in any 
pleading or proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true name of such adverse party is 
ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly. 
(3) Actions to Quiet Title; Description of Interest of Unknown Parties. In an action to quiet title wherein 
any of the parties are designated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings may describe such 
unknown persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or interest in, or 
lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or 
clouding his title thereto." 
flb) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and 
other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally. 
(c) Conditions Precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is 
sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A 
denial of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and when so 
made the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the trial establish the facts showing 
such performance or occurrence. 
(d) Official Document or Act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient to aver that the 
document was issued or the act done in compliance with law. 
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-
judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without 
setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be made 
specifically and with particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment or decision 
shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts. 
(f) Time and Place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and 
place are material and shall be considered like all other averments of material matter. 
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(g) Special Damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated. 
(h) Statute of Limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts 
showing the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is barred by the 
provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely 
by section number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision relied upon 
sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted, the party pleading the statute 
must establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is so barred. 
(i) Private Statutes; Ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an ordinance of any 
political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from such statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer 
to such statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or by its section number or other 
designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances. The court shall thereupon take 
judicial notice thereof. 
(j) Libel and Slander. 
(1) Pleading Defamatory Matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander to set forth any 
intrinsic facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the 
action arose; but it is sufficient to state generally that the same was published or spoken concerning 
the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party alleging such defamatory matter must 
establish, on the trial, that it was so published or spoken. 
(2) Pleading Defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant may allege both 
the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the 
amount of damages, and, whether he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence the 
mitigating circumstances. 
Rules Civ. Proc, Rule 9 
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